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Abstract
Using a new narrative measure of fiscal policy shocks for the United King-
dom, we show that households with mortgage debt exhibit large and significant
consumption responses to tax changes. Home-owners without a mortgage, in
contrast, do not adjust their expenditure, with responses not statistically dif-
ferent from zero at all horizons. We compare our findings to the predictions
of traditional and newer theories of liquidity constraints, providing a novel
interpretation for the aggregate effects of tax changes on the macroeconomy.
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1 Introduction
The persistent rise in mortgage debt prior to the recent financial crisis has drawn con-
siderable attention to the role of private indebtedness in the transmission of macroe-
conomic shocks in advanced economies. On the empirical side, Mian et al. (2012),
Dynan (2012) and the IMF (2012) report that high levels of household debt are likely
to have amplified and prolonged the Great Recession of 2007–08. On the theoretical
side, Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), Andres et al. (2012) and Kaplan and Violante
(2014) present heterogeneous agent models where fiscal policy is more effective the
larger the proportion of debt-constrained households.
A common presumption behind these studies is that debtors are more likely to face
liquidity constraints and therefore adjust their consumption significantly in response
to conditions that unexpectedly change their income. An important implication is
that it is not net wealth per se that determines the consumption response to fiscal
policy: households who made a large durable purchase, such as housing, may well
be wealthy and liquidity constrained at the same time. Despite the importance of
this transmission mechanism for both policy and academic research, little is known
empirically about whether the effects of tax changes on consumption vary with a
household’s debt position.
Looking at the empirical association between consumption, income and debt is
complicated by at least three factors. First, since consumption and income are jointly
determined we need to isolate the exogenous component of income changes. Second,
survey data with good coverage of expenditure typically lack equally detailed and
reliable information on wealth over a sufficiently long period of time. We therefore
need to identify a proxy for the household debt position. Third, commonly used
surveys are either repeated cross-sections, like the Family Expenditure Survey for the
U.K., or overlapping panels with a short time series dimension, like the Consumption
Expenditure Survey for the US. We therefore need to group individual observations
into aggregate pseudo-cohorts.
To address the endogeneity of income changes, we identify exogenous variation in
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taxes using the narrative approach pioneered by Romer and Romer (2010) and applied
to aggregate tax changes in the United Kingdom by Cloyne (2013). More specifically,
we construct a new series of changes in household income tax for the U.K. that are
exogenous to both macroeconomic and cohort-level fluctuations. The U.K. appears
a natural choice for our purposes because there have been a large number of income
tax changes in the last forty years and detailed official documents allow us to identify
individual tax measures and their motivations.
To elicit individual debt positions, we propose to group households by housing
tenure (whether households are mortgagors, outright owners or renters) using the UK
Family Expenditure Survey (FES) and compare the consumption response of home-
owners with mortgage debt with the response of outright home-owners (i.e. those
without a mortgage). The motivation for this novel grouping strategy is threefold.
First, mortgages are the most prominent form of household debt, in both incidence
and value. Second, the extensive margin of whether a household holds a mortgage
is likely to be less prone to measurement errors than the intensive margin of its
outstanding value (which is recorded consistently in the FES only over a shorter
period of time). Third, looking at housing tenure allows us to investigate the dynamic
effects of tax changes on the consumption of ‘social renters’ (i.e. those renting from
local authorities or housing associations). This is a group with virtually no net
wealth, low income and only compulsory education and therefore fits the traditional
stereotype of liquidity constrained households in one-asset models.1
A potential drawback of grouping households by their housing tenure status is the
possibility of endogenous transitions from one tenure status to another over time as
a result of any tax change. The very gradual rate at which ownership has risen in the
United Kingdom suggests this may be less of a concern. But, to verify this, we show
that our results are robust to using the grouping strategy proposed by Attanasio et al.
(2002), which explicitly addresses the possibility of endogenous movements between
1It is worth noting, however, that social renters account for only around 20% of the British
population and thus they seem unlikely, on their own, to account for the large and persistent effects
of tax changes on the aggregate economy typically found in empirical macro studies.
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groups and compositional change.
A more significant limitation of our empirical design is that households in our
sample are not randomly assigned to mortgagor, outright owner, or social renter
status. Indeed, we document some systematic differences between these groups, for
instance in terms of demographics and educational attainment, suggesting the pos-
sible presence of a selection issue: mortgagors may be responding differently from
outright owners not because they have a mortgage, but because some other trait that
makes households more responsive to tax changes is present disproportionately in the
mortgagor population. Nevertheless, it is difficult to identify obvious candidates for
such a trait, especially in light of our findings that the response by outright owners is
insignificant and small, that the heterogeneity in the consumption adjustment across
birth and education cohorts is limited, and the fact that we also present additional
results which line up, quantitatively and qualitatively, with the theoretical predic-
tions of a model based on liquidity constraints (but tend to accord less well with the
predictions associated with alternative explanations). Furthermore, even if we were
unable to establish conclusively that the effect of the tax cut is due to liquidity con-
straints, our results may have important policy implications in that they highlight a
new variable (mortgagor status) which performs exceptionally well in identifying the
group of population most likely to respond to policy changes.
This paper makes two main contributions to the fiscal policy literature. First,
we document that the dynamic effects of exogenous income tax changes on private
consumption are highly heterogeneous across housing tenures: mortgagors exhibit
the largest and most significant response, outright home-owners hardly adjust their
expenditure at all and social renters change their consumption somewhat less than
mortgagors. Second, we provide empirical support for the notion that household
mortgage debt positions play a role in the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy.
Specifically, as noted above, we show that our findings are consistent with the qual-
itative and quantitative predictions of a consumption model where accessing illiquid
wealth (such as housing) is subject to transaction costs. Since mortgagors tend to
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account for between 40% and 50% of the population over the sample, our evidence
suggests that this new type of liquidity-constrained household can make a substantial
contribution to the large effects of tax changes reported in earlier empirical macro
studies.
Related literature. This paper contributes to a growing body of empirical re-
search on consumption heterogeneity, including Anderson et al. (2012), De Giorgi
and Gambetti (2012a), Ercolani and Pavoni (2012) and Misra and Surico (2014)
among others. The findings from these studies have been interpreted as supportive
of theories of precautionary saving, partial insurance and limited participation. Our
results highlight the role of an additional channel in the transmission of structural
shocks: mortgage debt positions. This appears consistent with a framework where the
decision to purchase a large durable good through borrowing makes some households
‘wealthy’ hand-to-mouth, as in Kaplan and Violante (2014).
Our results also relate to a range of empirical contributions on the macroeconomic
effects of fiscal policy on real activity. While our estimates are consistent with those
reported by Romer and Romer (2010), Mertens and Ravn (2012), Caldara and Kamps
(2008, 2012), Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and Cloyne (2013), among others, our
approach allows us to identify which households drive the aggregate result as well as
which individual characteristics tend to predict a higher sensitivity of consumption
to income changes.
While we consider the heterogeneous effects of income tax changes, another strand
of the literature has looked at the heterogeneous effects of government spending
across different industries (Nekarda and Ramey (2011)), the state of the business
cycle (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013), Owyang et al. (2013)) and across
households (Giavazzi and McMahon (2012), De Giorgi and Gambetti (2012b)).
Paper layout. Our analysis is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our new
series of narrative-identified tax changes and describes how we use the household
survey data to construct expenditure measures by housing tenure. Section 3 finds
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pervasive heterogeneity in the consumption responses to tax changes across housing
tenures and demonstrates robustness across an extensive list of modifications to our
baseline specification. Section 4 examines the relationship between mortgage debt
and liquidity constraints, and the extent to which this is consistent with our findings.
We show that this channel compares favourably with the alternative explanations
assessed in Section 5. The Appendices contain a description of the data and further
econometric results. A Supplementary Appendix presents the narrative evidence
supporting the construction of our exogenous income tax series.
2 Identification
In this section, we present our identification strategy and the data sets we employ.
We first discuss the narrative data on UK tax changes and the way we exploit these
to construct an exogenous income tax measure. We then move to the household
survey data and the grouping strategy used to construct time series of consumption
for pseudo-cohorts based on housing tenure status.
2.1 UK income tax changes and the narrative approach
A key identification challenge we face is that tax changes may affect consumption
and other macroeconomic variables but common measures of taxes are also affected
by the state of the economy. This may be because tax revenues are affected auto-
matically by the cycle or because discretionary policy actions are taken in response
to macroeconomic or cohort-level economic conditions. Since our household tenure
groups are large shares of the population, the simultaneity between fiscal policy and
consumption prevents consistent estimation.
To address the identification problem, we employ a narrative approach following
Romer and Romer (2010) for the United States and Cloyne (2013) for the United
Kingdom. We use detailed documentation from historical sources to identify ‘exoge-
nous’ legislated changes in tax policy from the motivations given by lawmakers at
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the time of the policy intervention.2 Unfortunately, the narrative measures of aggre-
gate tax changes used in earlier contributions contain changes to a variety of taxes
such as income, consumption and capital taxes, each of which may affect household
groups differently (e.g. Stamp Duty, Vehicle Excise Duty etc). Ideally, we seek tax
changes that affect all housing tenure groups. We therefore focus on specific changes
to household income taxes.
Income tax in the U.K. is payable on a wide range of income including earnings
from employment, property, interest, retirement pensions and some social security
benefits. Further details of the UK income tax system are provided in Appendix A.
To focus on changes that affect all income taxpayers, we collect a data set of changes
affecting the lowest bracket of income tax. Specifically, we consider changes in the tax
free allowances (that determine the level of income above which income tax starts to
be paid), the basic rate of income tax (currently 20 per cent) and the income bands
defining the basic rate. We refer to this group of tax changes as the allowance and
basic rate of income tax.3
Our starting point is the narrative record of tax interventions in the U.K. reported
by Cloyne (2012). More specifically, we work back through all the original documents
to collect the specific set of income taxes. While some of this information is already
contained in Cloyne (2012), in many cases there is not enough detail for our new
purpose. For instance, the types of tax changes (e.g. allowances and basic rate
changes) are not specifically categorised in a manner that is readily suitable for our
purpose.
Our narrative analysis isolates around 140 changes in the allowances and basic
rate of income tax.4 For the quantitative magnitude of each change, we follow Romer
2The idea has been applied to government spending (Ramey and Shapiro (1998); Ramey (2011)),
monetary policy (Romer and Romer (1989, 2004)) and fiscal consolidations (Guajardo et al. (2011)).
3Mertens and Ravn (2013) split the Romer and Romer dataset into corporate and personal tax
liabilities and study the macroeconomic effects of these tax changes. As we examine sub-groups of
the population, we need to construct a more specific measure of income tax changes.
4This measure is even more conservative than the narrative series used in Cloyne and Surico
(2013) as we drop a small number of tax changes that, while not explicitly directed to a specific
housing tenure group, might be argued to have affected unevenly other (small) groups in society.
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and Romer (2010) and use the revenue forecasts from the Budget documents. The
focus is on the change in tax liabilities rather than any short-run revenue effect due
to the timing of revenues reaching the Treasury. Consequently we use the ‘full year’
revenue estimate, which is the projected on-going annualised effect on tax liabilities.
This value is assigned to the implementation date of the policy change. The main
sources for the policy changes and revenue estimates is the Financial Statement and
Budget Report (FSBR) which is published alongside the Budget speech. As explained
by Mertens and Ravn (2012), the implementation date might be anticipated whenever
the policy announcement takes place some time before its implementation. We ad-
dress this possibility in Section 3 and show that our findings are robust to considering
only tax changes implemented on announcement.
As in Romer and Romer (2010) and Cloyne (2013), we categorise all the indi-
vidual tax changes as either exogenous and endogenous based on whether they were
motivated as a response to changing macroeconomic conditions (for example, GDP,
consumption or other spending decisions). Unlike Cloyne (2013), however, we also
examine whether the policy changes followed fluctuations in the circumstances of
particular housing tenure groups. Our new measure is therefore also exogenous to
developments in these specific cohorts. Much more detail regarding the sources, meth-
ods and supporting narrative evidence can be found in the Supplementary Appendix.
Here, we briefly note that, in categorising the given motivations, we use a variety of
UK government, parliamentary and historical documents and speeches. The main
source is either the Chancellor’s Parliamentary speech recorded in Hansard (the of-
ficial parliamentary record), or the Economic and Fiscal Strategy Report (EFSR)
published with more recent Budgets.
Individual exogenous income tax changes are assigned to quarters and aggregated.
Figure 1 shows, as the solid line, our newly compiled tax series scaled by nominal
GDP, together with the aggregate tax change series in Cloyne (2013) as the dashed
line. There have been a sizable number of income tax changes and many of these have
been quite large, providing good variation in our narrative tax series over time. The
8
large majority of these legislated changes were reforms designed to encourage long-
run economic performance, sharpening incentives and lowering the overall burden
of taxation. Reassuringly, the correlation between all other exogenous income tax
changes and our measure of changes to the allowance and the basic rate is low, at
0.15. Similarly, the correlation with all other exogenous tax changes is −0.07. This
suggests that changes in our measure were not contemporaneously offset by changes
in the higher rates of income tax.
Two features of the narrative construction of a tax shock series are worth em-
phasizing. First, the official Budget documents report projections for the change in
annual tax liabilities as a result of the legislated policy action (rather than the ab-
solute effect on the levels). Second, narrative-identified tax shocks (including ours)
tend to exhibits virtually no persistence. These two features imply that the empirical
model, discussed below, mechanically simulates the dynamic effect of a one pound
tax cut as a shock that lowers, by one pound, the level of taxes paid in each year
of the forecast period.5 Given the frequency with which income taxes have changed
over our sample period, however, it would seem difficult to interpret our shocks as
permanent.
In Romer and Romer (2010) and Cloyne (2013), the tax measure can be thought
of as the change in an aggregate average tax rate. For our purpose, however, it makes
less sense to divide income tax liabilities by aggregate GDP as this would not reflect
an average tax rate. Instead, we transform our nominal tax liabilities series into a
(real) income tax change per taxpayer. We divide the (narrative) projected change
in nominal liabilities by the Retail Prices Index (RPIX) and the total number of
individual income taxpayers. Over a three year horizon, this amounts to an average
tax change of about 700 pounds sterling per household at 2009 prices.
5In contrast to Mertens and Ravn (2013) for the US, tax revenue data for the UK are not suf-
ficiently detailed to construct a National Accounts quarterly counterpart of the specific subgroup
of income taxes we consider (nor the tax base) over a long period of time. We have verified, how-
ever, that our measure generates persistent movements in total income tax revenues (from National
Accounts) as a share of GDP, although the estimates become less precise at longer horizons.
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Cohort-specific Granger Causality Tests. The narrative account in the Supple-
mentary Appendix suggests that our newly constructed income tax changes should, if
truly exogenous, be unpredictable on the basis of either cohort-specific or macroeco-
nomic conditions and we now verify this. Specifically, we conduct Granger causality
tests based on a VAR which contains the change in consumption and income per
capita for each household group, the change in real GDP and government spending
per capita, the central bank’s policy rate, the change in the FTSE and RPIX inflation.
Reassuringly, we could not reject the hypothesis that the cohort-specific variables do
not Granger cause our income tax series: the p-values using various lag lengths were
high, over 0.4, for 4, 6 and 8 lags.
2.2 Household consumption data
The focus of our analysis is on whether households with mortgage debt respond more
to income tax changes than those without. For this purpose, we need both good
quality household expenditure data and information on household debt positions.
Household expenditure data are obtained using 32 waves, from 1978 to 2009, of the
Living Costs and Food Survey, commonly known as the Family Expenditure Survey.
This survey has high quality, detailed information on expenditure and household char-
acteristics.6 Each wave contains around 7,000 households, generating over 200,000
observations in total (see Appendix B).
Ideally, we would like to observe individual balance sheet positions and expen-
diture. Unfortunately, there are no micro data sets that jointly record detailed in-
formation on consumption and wealth over a sufficiently long time period and the
FES is no exception. To construct a pseudo-panel, it is therefore common to use a
grouping estimator along the lines proposed by Browning et al. (1985). Given our
focus on mortgage debt, housing tenure appears a natural dimension to aggregate
households in three pseudo-cohorts, therefore bypassing the lack of household debt
data. Since loans secured on housing represent the majority of household debt, we
6While the survey has run from 1968, educational attainment is only available from 1978.
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are particularly interested in whether home owners with mortgage debt react more
to tax changes than home-owners without.
As another interesting group, we consider a third tenure category: those living in
accommodation rented from local authorities or housing associations. For short, we
refer to these households as ‘social renters’. These households tend to be poorer, have
only compulsory education and — as we will show using less frequent data from the
British Household Panel Survey — have little liquid or illiquid wealth.7 The social
renters therefore fit the demographic characteristics of those more likely to be credit
constrained in the traditional sense used in earlier empirical contributions. For this
reason, we see the ‘social renter’ group as a useful comparison.
We focus on non-durable goods and services expenditure. Since we examine the
response of consumption to tax changes, we only want to include taxpayers in our
sample. The FES contains information on income taxes paid and we therefore exclude
households who reported they did not pay any tax. However, there may be some
measurement error associated with this reporting. After excluding these households,
we also then drop any remaining households whose income was below the threshold
for paying income tax.8
In our sample, mortgagors represent about 45% of the observations, on average,
while social renters and owners outright represent around 20 % and 25 % each. Private
renters averages around a 10% share but over several quarters around the middle of
the sample their number appears too low (below sixty) to draw any reliable inference
and are therefore excluded.
Each household is assigned to a quarter based on the date of the interview. To
account for some (unrealistically) high or low values of consumption, for each quarter
and tenure group we drop the top and bottom 1% of observations.9 Then, we sum-up
7Unlike the FES, the BHPS has limited consumption coverage, mostly on food expenditure.
8These two strategies largely identify the same group of households, whose dominant share
(around 70%) is made of social renters. Non-tax paying social renters represent about 40% of the
total number of social renters in the whole FES sample. We have verified that the non-taxpayers’
consumption response to our income tax shock is never statistically different from zero.
9Similar but less precise estimates for the unrestricted sample are in Cloyne and Surico (2013).
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the individual survey responses within each cohort by quarter using household weights
that ensure representativeness in the British population, divide by the number of
people in the household to generate a per capita measure and divide by the retail
prices index excluding mortgage repayments (RPIX). To address seasonality, we use
the annual change in quarterly expenditure for each group.
One issue using a grouping estimator is that the dimension along which the ag-
gregation is performed needs to be fully predictable over time. In our case, we do
not know whether a household with a particular tenure status had the same tenure
status in the previous period or whether it will still have the same tenure status in
the next period. Figure 2 shows that there has been some variation in the shares of
the tenure groups over time, especially before 1986, although the dynamics of these
series appear to be relatively slow moving. To ensure robustness of our findings, we
also consider grouping households according to their predicted probabilities of having
a mortgage based on exogenous observables. More specifically, in the next section, we
complement the evidence using actual housing tenure groupings with results based
on the propensity score grouping strategy proposed by Attanasio et al. (2002). We
also assess the sensitivity of our findings to using shorter samples that start between
the mid-1980s and the early 1990s which, according to Figure 2, were characterized
by a greater stability in the evolution of tenure shares.
Before turning to the estimation, it is useful to examine the demographic proper-
ties of our pseudo-cohorts. For each group, Figure 3 shows kernel density estimates
of age (i.e. the difference between interview year and household head’s birth year)
and weekly household real income per adult as well as the shares of households with
different education levels and the shares of households with positive non-mortgage
debt. Mortgagors were born on average in later years (so tend to be younger in our
sample), tend to be more educated and appear relatively richer. It is worth noting,
however, that the distributions of the three tenure groups overlap significantly.10 In
particular, the estimated densities for both groups of home owners are characterised
10A similar picture emerges considering household disposable income.
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by a long right tail. This means that average income of outright owners is relatively
closer to the average income of mortgagors rather than social renters.11 Finally, the
mortgagor group has the largest share of households with positive non-mortgage debt
while outright owners have the lowest.12
3 The heterogeneous effects of tax changes
In this section, we document significant heterogeneity in the dynamic effects of fiscal
policy by reporting the estimated consumption responses across actual housing tenure
groups. To assess concerns of possible endogenous changes in group composition, we
then show that our findings are not overturned when households are grouped accord-
ing to their predicted probability (based on a nonlinear polynomial in demographics,
education and time trends) of having the same housing tenure status in the previous
year (which we do not observe in the repeated cross-sections of the FES).
For each tenure group, we estimate a separate Vector Autoregression (VAR). The
VAR includes the change in group-specific consumption, the change in real GDP, the
level of the central bank’s policy rate and the change in real government spending.
We use four lags of these endogenous variables.13 In line with the empirical literature
on narrative measures of fiscal shocks, the first twelve lags and the contemporaneous
value of our newly compiled exogenous measure of income tax changes enter the VAR
as exogenous variables. The contemporaneous values of the share of households with
post-compulsory education and the average difference between interview year and
birth year in each quarter are added as further exogenous regressors to control for
other unrelated life-cycle factors. In Cloyne and Surico (2013), we show that the
results below are robust to running the single equation specification used in Romer
and Romer (2010) as well as to using the method of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions.
11The sub-sample evidence in Appendix C reveals that the distributions of education and age
have not changed much over time. In contrast, income has become more unequal, although this
has largely been a feature of the top of the income distribution. Consequently, it has affected the
average income of the owners and mortgagors but less so the average income of social renters.
12This is based on the shorter FES sample 1986-2009 for which non-mortgage debt is available.
13Similar results are obtained using shorter or longer lag lengths.
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3.1 Actual housing tenure
The point estimates of the dynamic effects of the income tax cut on non-durable
expenditure for each housing tenure group are reported in Figure 4 as solid lines with
circles. The shaded area represents the 68% confidence intervals based on 10,000
bootstrap repetitions; the grey lines show the 95% intervals.
Each point of the impulse response function represents the effect on annual con-
sumption following a one pound tax change, relative to what would have happened
in the absence of the shock.14 Since our shock series reflects changes in taxes, this is
equivalent to a shock that lowers the level of taxes by one pound in each of the three
years of the forecast period. The response at the end of each year can therefore be
seen as the fiscal multiplier in that year of the simulation, although — as discussed
in Section 2 — we do not regard these tax changes as permanent.
The first row shows that the consumption of mortgagors responds significantly
at the 5% level beyond the third quarter and reaches a peak around 2 pounds after
three years. In contrast, the response of owners without mortgage (in the last row) is
never statistically different from zero, even at the 32% significance level, and peaks
below 0.4 or 40 pence at six quarters after the shock. Finally, the point estimates
in the second row suggest that social renters change their non-durable expenditure
by slightly less than one pound, with responses that are significant at 5% between
quarters 3 and 6.15 As owners without a mortgage tend to have a significantly higher
gross income than social renters, it seems unlikely that the heterogeneity in Figure
4 is driven by possible heterogeneity in the tax change, although we return to this
issue in the sensitivity analysis below.
Turning to the overall magnitudes, the peak effect for mortgagors is equivalent
to a peak fiscal multiplier on consumption of 2 in the third year. The associated
14The response of annual consumption is constructed by cumulating the impulse response func-
tion for the annual change in quarterly expenditure, which was estimated using VAR specification
discussed above.
15The finding of heterogeneity across groups is robust to using the log difference of consumption,
as opposed to the consumption change. Under this transformation, however, the size of the responses
are difficult to interpret as we only observe the tax liability changes projected by HM Treasury.
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cumulative multiplier over three years (i.e. the overall change in consumption relative
to the overall changes in taxes) is 1.29. It is important to note that these numbers
reflect the general equilibrium effect of the tax stimulus on the economy: Appendix
E shows that income also responds strongly (roughly twice as much as mortgagors’
consumption), with cumulative multipliers for household income between 2 and 3
depending on the specification. Importantly, income moves for all tenure groups
but, as we will show in Section 4, the relative response of consumption is large and
significant for mortgagors but not for outright home-owners. In that section, we
also show that the absolute magnitudes of our estimates are consistent with the tax
multipliers typically found in macroeconomic narrative studies such as Romer and
Romer (2010).
In summary, our estimates suggest that housing tenure is highly correlated with
the characteristics that drive the heterogenous response of household consumption to
an exogenous income tax change. Specifically, whether a household has mortgage debt
seems an important candidate for explaining how tax changes affect consumption. In
Section 4, we will show that the composition of the mortgagors’ asset portfolio — in
particular the lack of significant liquid net wealth — could indeed make this group
more responsive changes in their income.
3.2 Propensity score methods
The shares of social renters, mortgagors and outright owners have varied slowly over
time, as shown in Figure 2. Still, if households have chosen to move to another
housing tenure status in response to the fiscal shock, this may distort our inference.
Furthermore, the changes in the time series of consumption that we construct for each
pseudo-cohort can only make sense in the absence of significant compositional changes
across housing tenure groups. To assess the empirical relevance of these concerns, we
adapt the methodology proposed by Attanasio et al. (2002) to generate individual
predicted probabilities of having mortgage debt over a number of subsequent periods.
Specifically, we run a probit regression over the full sample to generate individual
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predicted probabilities of having a mortgage based on a high order polynomial in
age, education, a time trend and their interactions. For households observed in
quarter t, we compute the probability that they had a mortgage four quarters earlier.
For these two periods, we classify households as ‘likely’ or ‘unlikely mortgagors’ if
the probability in the first of the two periods is larger or smaller than the share of
mortgagors in that period. We then take the difference in consumption across these
two quarters for each group.
By running the probit specification over the full-sample and opting for a time-
varying threshold, the propensity score method of Attanasio et al. (2002) is tailored
to minimize the effects of endogenous changes across tenure groups and classification
errors. However, the composition of the likely mortgagor group may still change
either because the probability of ownership changes over time or because the cutoff
point changes. To deal with this second set of issues, we follow the recommendations
in Attanasio et al. (2002) and run also a probit regression for every year of our sample
and, more importantly, we use a fixed cutoff equal to the average share of mortgagors
in the total population over the full sample, although we have verified that the results
below do not hinge upon the specific value chosen. By using a classification threshold
that does not vary with time, the method minimizes the possible biases induced by
changes in group composition. To make the contrast between outright owners and
mortgagors sharper we have excluded renters from this exercise.16
The results of this exercise are displayed in Figure 5. The left column reports
estimates that use a full-sample probit regression and a time-varying cut-off while
the right column refers to impulse responses that address possible compositional
changes using year-by-year probit regressions and a fixed threshold. Consistent with
the evidence based on actual housing tenure, the response of the ‘unlikely’ mortgagors
is never significant at the 5% level. In contrast, the response of the ‘likely’ mortgagors
remains significant at the 5% level after four quarters and, in line with the estimates
in Figure 4, peaks at around 2 after three years. It is still the case that the 95%
16In Cloyne and Surico (2013), we report similar but less precise estimates when including renters.
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confidence bands for the likely mortgagors do not include the point estimates for the
unlikely mortgagors after six quarters. We therefore conclude that the heterogeneous
consumption responses between households with and without mortgage debt is robust
to presence of possible endogenous changes in group composition.17 We return to the
issue of compositional change in Section 5.
Income also responds for both groups, as shown in Appendix E. In fact, using the
propensity score method, the income response is very similar for likely and unlikely
mortgagors, reinforcing the result that the differential responses of consumption are
not driven by differential movements in income. We discuss this further in Section 4.
3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
We now conduct a range of sensitivity tests to ensure the robustness of our main
results. For brevity, we list here the main findings and report the full set of results
in the Appendix.
Other tax changes. In considering a subset of tax changes, one possible concern
is that these are correlated with other tax changes whose omission may then distort
our inference. In Figure 9 of the Appendix, we show that our findings are robust to
adding the first twelve lags and the contemporaneous values of any other exogenous
tax changes identified by the narrative method. Furthermore, we have verified that
our shock series does not trigger a significant response of these other tax changes over
the three year forecast period.
Anticipation. One issue is whether the tax changes we consider were anticipated.
In Figure 10, we therefore re-estimate the baseline specification but use the ‘unan-
17In the online Appendix, we use the yearly panel dimension of the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS) between 1991 and 2009 — when the BHPS starts and when our sample ends respectively —
to verify that our tax shocks do not have statistical power predicting whether a household changes
housing tenure. Similarly, using the FES over our full sample at quarterly frequency, our tax
shocks do not predict whether a household belongs to a specific tenure group. Furthermore, in both
regressions, the coefficients on age, family size and educational attainment are very significant but
the adjusted R2 is never above 0.04 for the BHPS and 0.2 for the FES.
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ticipated’ component of our exogenous income tax changes. We follow Mertens and
Ravn (2012) by defining an unanticipated change as one that was implemented within
90 days of announcement. The evidence from this exercise suggests that our earlier
findings are broadly confirmed.18
Sub-sample stability. Another sensitivity test is to analyse whether the shape of
the responses for each group varies over time. In Figure 11, we show that this is not
the case by looking at estimates over increasingly shorter samples that start in 1986,
1988, 1990 and 1992 respectively. These years have been chosen as beginning of the
sub-sample because, according to Figure 2, the largest changes in the housing tenure
status occurred between the 1980s and the early 1990s.
Spending categories. Figure 12 shows that excluding semi-durable categories
(such as ‘apparel’, ‘health’ and ‘reading’) from non-durable goods and services in
the second column of ‘strictly non-durables’ does not affect the heterogeneity or the
size of the consumption responses, suggesting our main findings are not driven by the
more durable component of non-durable expenditure. In addition, we record larger
(and far less precise) point estimates for the responses of non-housing expenditure,
but these do not seem statistically different from the responses in Figure 4. Interest-
ingly, Figure 12 also shows that spending on necessities such as food hardly responds
across the three housing tenure groups.
Size of the tax change. Finally, to examine the extent to which our findings may
reflect (omitted) heterogeneity in income, we use the cohort-specific average level
of income to construct a measure of the exogenous tax liability change that reflects
possible variation in the tax base and, therefore, in the average income tax rate across
housing tenure groups. Figure 13 shows that our earlier findings of heterogeneity are
robust also to this exercise.
18Unfortunately, there are only seven tax changes over our full sample which can be deemed as
anticipated — too few to be able to carry out a similar analysis for this subgroup.
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4 Exploring the role of mortgage debt
In the previous section, we documented substantial heterogeneity in the consumption
responses to tax changes. In this section, we provide evidence that our findings
are consistent with a model where liquidity constraints are associated with having
mortgage debt.
We begin by summarizing some of the main testable predictions from a recent the-
oretical framework developed by Kaplan and Violante (2014) and then confront these
predictions with the data. In this model, there are transactions costs associated with
accessing illiquid wealth, and this would make households with mortgage debt more
responsive to income tax changes. We go on to show that our estimates are consistent
with the magnitudes reported in earlier empirical and theoretical contributions on the
effects of fiscal policy. In contrast, in the next section, we argue that alternative hy-
potheses, including demographics, impatience, rational inattention, risk-aversion and
compositional changes are unlikely to fit all our findings.
4.1 Insights from a model of hand-to-mouth households
A popular explanation for the sizable effects of fiscal policy found in the empirical
literature is that a fraction of households are hand-to-mouth, meaning they consume a
significant fraction of any additional income they receive. The conventional wisdom
is that these households are typically renters, have a young household-head, have
lower educational attainment and are on a low income. While this view is often
entertained in policy and academic circles, it has been shown that for an empirically
plausible fraction of these households (typically around 10%), the standard one-asset
model has a hard time replicating the sizable consumption response of households to
a fiscal stimulus (once the model distribution of net worth is calibrated to match the
distribution observed in the data).
To tackle this challenge, Kaplan and Violante (2014) propose a partial equilib-
rium model of consumption in which households can store wealth in two forms: a
liquid asset (such as bank accounts) and an illiquid asset (such as housing). The
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crucial feature of their framework is that the illiquid asset carries an exogenously
higher rate of return but can be accessed only by paying a transaction cost. When
this assumption is built into an incomplete-markets life-cycle economy, Kaplan and
Violante (2014) show that a significant fraction of households optimally choose to
spend a large fraction of any positive change in their income, despite holding sizable
amounts of illiquid wealth. The intuition is that the welfare loss of not smoothing
consumption turns out to be smaller than the cost of accessing their illiquid wealth
or of holding large balances of cash and foregoing the higher return on the illiquid
asset. They refer to these agents as ‘wealthy hand-to-mouth’.
4.2 Testable predictions
Using a quantitative model parameterized to replicate a number of life-cycle and cross-
sectional features of advanced economies (see also Kaplan et al. (2014)), a numerical
implication of the analysis in Kaplan and Violante (2014) is that for transaction costs
close to $1000, the ‘wealthy hand-to-mouth’ households display a marginal propensity
to consume (MPC) around 0.43 while unconstrained agents are characterized by a
MPC of about 0.07. This specific value for transaction costs seems in line with
both their favourite estimate for the U.S. and our back of the envelope calculation
of £700 for the U.K. (see Cloyne and Surico (2013)). The Kaplan-Violante model
also generates a further theoretical prediction: the consumption response of ‘wealthy
hand-to-mouth’ households should only be large when the income change is small
relative to the transaction costs of assessing their illiquid wealth. In the face of
sufficiently large income changes, in contrast, households are better off paying the
transaction costs and re-optimizing their plans, producing a MPC close to zero. In
this case, households pay the extra resources into their illiquid asset despite the
existence of transaction costs. In this section we evaluate both of these testable
predictions.
20
Liquid versus illiquid net wealth. Traditional explanations for a significant con-
sumption response to an unexpected income change emphasizes net wealth as an im-
portant driver of heterogeneous behaviour. In short, wealthier households are less
likely to be liquidity constrained. Since this argument is typically made in the con-
text of one-asset models, the academic and policy discussion seems to have implicitly
abstracted from the distinction between liquid and illiquid assets. To the extent that
most household wealth is held in the form of housing, and therefore not immediately
accessible, looking at liquid net wealth (as opposed to total) may shed light on the
heterogeneous consumption responses across the three tenure groups.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the distributions of financial and housing
wealth by tenure group, using the only three years for which the BHPS has asked
questions on the household’s financial position. Following Crossley and O’Dea (2010),
net financial wealth is defined as the value of saving and investment net of non-
mortgage debt and is meant to provide a measure of the stock of liquid assets.19
Net housing wealth is the difference between the property value estimated by the
household and the value of any outstanding mortgage.
Three important findings emerge from Table 1. First, social renters — who ac-
count for about 20% of the sample — are characterized by little liquid financial net
wealth and no housing wealth. Together with the fact that they tend to be younger
than the other groups and have a higher proportion of households with compulsory
education only, social renters appear to fit the traditional stereotype of liquidity con-
strained households. Second, outright owners — who make up around 25% of the
population — score high in both financial and housing wealth and seem unlikely to
face significant credit constraints. Third, mortgagors — approximately 45% of the
population — seem in-between the other two groups as they have low liquid net
19‘Saving’ includes: Savings or Deposit Accounts, National Savings Bank Accounts and Cash
ISAs (or TESSAs). ‘Investment’ comprises: National Savings Certificates, Premium Bonds, Unit
trusts/Investment trusts, Stocks and shares ISAs (or PEPs), Shares, National Savings Bonds (cap-
ital, income or deposit) and Other investments (gilts, government or company securities). ‘Non-
mortgage debt’ refer to: Hire purchase agreements, Personal Loans, Credit and store cards, Cata-
logue or mail order purchase agreements, DWP Social Fund loans, Overdrafts and Student Loans.
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wealth but high housing wealth. Indeed, in each of the three years, more than 50%
of mortgagors hold either non-positive financial net wealth or only a small positive
amount. As the vast majority of mortgagors have at least some equity in their house,
their total net wealth tends to be high, although it might not be immediately acces-
sible. The mortgagor group therefore seems to fit well the characteristics of wealthy
hand-to-mouth households.
Small versus large tax changes. To verify whether mortgagors are indeed ‘wealthy’
hand-to-mouth as in Kaplan and Violante (2014), Figure 6 shows the response of non-
durable consumption for this tenure group to ‘smaller’ and ‘larger’ tax changes. For
any given quarter, we define a change in our tax change series as ‘smaller’ (‘larger’)
if the associated household income change over the subsequent three years is below
(above) 1, 200 pounds at 2009 prices. While the results below are not specific to this
value, the choice of the 1, 200 pounds cut-off allows us to split our baseline measure
into two groups whose averages are sufficiently far apart, at about 500 pounds and
1, 500 pounds respectively.
A key finding from Figure 6 is that mortgagors significantly adjust their non-
durable consumption only in response to ‘smaller’ tax cuts. The response to ‘larger’
changes, in contrast, is never statistically positive. Furthermore, the difference be-
tween the two dynamic effects is sizable and often significant, especially over the
second year and towards the end of the forecast period. The dashed blue line with
squares repeats the point estimates for mortgagors’ from Figure 4. The comparison
between the blue line with squares and the black lines with circles reveals that the
baseline response is always above the point estimates of the response to the larger
tax changes (as well as outside the associated 95% confidence band) but it is typically
below the point estimates of the response to the smaller tax changes (becoming even
statistically different over part of the second year forecast horizon). In summary, the
size of the income change does appear to trigger different consumption behaviour.20
20We also repeated this exercise for outright owners and social renters, finding little evidence for
a significantly different response to the two types of tax changes for these housing tenure groups.
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An interesting implication of this finding is that, for a ‘wealthy hand-to-mouth’ house-
hold, there may be an optimal tax cut size to stimulate the economy.
Quantitative assessment. To explore further the interpretation of mortgagors as
‘wealthy hand-to-mouth’ households, we compare the magnitude of the cumulated
response of consumption relative to the cumulated response of income implied by our
estimates to the magnitude of the MPCs reported in the partial equilibrium model of
Kaplan and Violante (2014). It is important to note that, however, that the significant
response of income for all housing tenure groups, reported in Appendix E, strongly
suggests that the overall magnitudes of both the consumption and income responses
reflect (at least partially) the general equilibrium effect of the tax cut.
Panel A of Table 2 reports the ratio of the discounted total consumption change
to the total discounted income change triggered by the tax change over the three year
period. Panel B (C), reports the total discounted consumption (income) change over
the three year period relative to the total discounted tax change (about three pounds
in our simulations) simulated over the same period.21,22 For the sake of comparison,
the row labeled Kaplan and Violante (2014) reproduces the quantitative predictions of
their model for hand-to-mouth households (under the column ‘likely mortgagors’) and
non hand-to-mouth households (under the column ‘likely outright owners’) assuming
transactions costs around $1000 (see figure 5(b) in their paper). The rows labeled
Romer and Romer (2010) will be discussed in the next section.
The results in Panel A of Table 2 show that for every pound of additional income,
mortgagors spend a significant fraction on consumption — around 55 pence — across
the three estimation procedures used earlier (based on either predicted probabilities or
actual tenure groups). Interestingly, the confidence bands around the point estimates
for (‘likely’) mortgagors always include the MPC of 0.43 that Kaplan and Violante
21Denoting Xt the annual change of a quarterly variable, the discounted value (relative to the tax
change) over a three year forecast horizon is (βXt+4 + β
2Xt+8 + β
3Xt+12)/(β + β
2 + β3) where the
discount factor is β = 1/(1 + r) with r being the average annual rate of interest.
22The income responses to the tax change reported in Appendix E are based on the VARs of
Section 3, using group-specific income rather than GDP.
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(2014) report as a plausible value for the wealthy hand-to-mouth households in their
quantitative model. But the same bands never include the MPC of 0.07 for non hand-
to-mouth agents. The response of consumption relative to income for the (‘likely’)
outright owners, in contrast, is never statistically significant and is quantitatively
similar to the MPC of the unconstrained households in Kaplan and Violante (2014).
We conclude that, once the general equilibrium effects are taken into account, our
estimates are consistent with the magnitudes predicted by a quantitative consumption
model where transaction costs make it costly for mortgagor-type households to access
their illiquid asset.
4.3 Comparison with the empirical macro literature
Using a narrative identification approach, a growing body of empirical research in
macroeconomics has estimated the response of aggregate consumption and GDP. For
example, in the seminal contribution by Romer and Romer (2010) the cumulative
multiplier (i.e. the cumulative effect on the variable of interest relative to the size of
the tax change) is around 0.89 for consumption and 1.78 for output.23 Their GDP
multiplier at the peak is around 3. Cloyne (2013) finds similar magnitudes for the
U.K.24 In Panels B and C of Table 2, we compare the findings of this macro literature
with the estimates in our paper (for different household groups using survey micro
data).
In Panel B, the cumulative consumption multiplier is large and significant only
for the (‘likely’) mortgagors. The associated confidence bands also never include
the smaller and insignificant value for the (‘likely’) outright owners. Interestingly,
the estimated response of aggregate Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) from
Romer and Romer’s specification sits in-between the set of point estimates for the two
23These numbers refer to the cumulative effect on GDP and consumption replicated using Romers’
dataset available online and the exact empirical specifications used in their paper. To make the data
more comparable with our micro data, we use per capita series rather than the aggregate series
cited in the original paper. However, the numbers are very similar when using the non-per capita
measures: 0.88 and 1.61 for consumption and GDP respectively.
24In Cloyne and Surico (2013), we also find similar results for aggregate consumption using official
consumption data and using an aggregate series constructed from our micro data.
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tenure groups. Furthermore, the results in Panel C show that the income multiplier
is not quantitatively different between households with debt and households without
debt (with the possible exception of the imprecise point estimates based on actual
housing tenures) and that the implied cumulative multiplier for GDP from Romer
and Romer (2010) appears consistent with the estimates we report for the two groups.
Our findings are therefore consistent with the absolute effects on consumption and
output reported in the empirical macro literature on tax changes.
5 Other explanations
Sections 3 and 4 contain two main messages. First, that the consumption of house-
holds with mortgage debt is the most responsive to changes in taxes. Second, that
our qualitative and quantitative findings are consistent with a model of ‘wealthy hand
to mouth’ consumers.
One may be concerned, however, about a potential selection issue, namely that
mortgage debt is correlated with some other (more structural) trait which makes
households more responsive to tax changes. In this section, we therefore discuss
the extent to which other explanations may fit our findings. Since the behaviour of
social renters seems to square with the predictions of traditional liquidity constraint
models, we focus here on the differential responses of mortgagors and outright owners.
In particular, we will show that demographics, rational inattention, impatience and
risk seem to provide less compelling explanations for all our empirical results. Finally,
we provide further evidence to show that our results are unlikely to be explained by
compositional change.
Demographics. A long-standing approach in micro-econometrics has proxied the
presence of liquidity constraints with the household head’s birth year and educational
attainment. However, whether these more traditional dimensions provide sharper
evidence of heterogeneity than housing tenure remains an empirical question and one
25
we tackle in this section.25
The answer provided by Figure 7 is based on VAR specifications in which house-
holds are grouped depending on whether the head is born after 1955 (first row),
between 1930 and 1955 (second row) or before 1930 (third row). The columns then
split these pseudo-cohorts further, depending on whether the household head attained
only compulsory or also post-compulsory education. The point estimates suggest that
the ‘younger’ (born after 1955) and the ‘middled-aged’ more educated tend to change
their non-durable consumption by a larger amount than the other groups. But the
heterogeneity reported in Figure 7 appears more muted and far less precise than the
heterogeneity in Figure 4 where housing tenure was associated with the presence of
liquidity constraints.
Why might grouping by housing tenure deliver clearer evidence of heterogeneity
in the response of consumption?26 To answer this, it is useful to revisit the demo-
graphic statistics in Figure 3. Specifically, we compute the shares of mortgagors and
outright owners within each birth year/education pseudo-cohort. These shares are
also reported in each panel of Figure 7. On the one hand, the largest consumption
responses using the birth year/education split occur for cohorts characterized by the
largest share of mortgagors. On the other hand, in none of the panels in Figure 7
is the share of mortgagors greater than 70%, which potentially explains the larger
confidence intervals relative to Figure 4: each birth year/education pseudo-cohort
pools together households with different debt positions and thus different consump-
tion responses. In Appendix F, we show that similar results and interpretations arise
when we group households by birth year and education separately.27
25A further advantage of grouping households by housing tenure, relative to using birth year,
liquidity, leverage or income is that we do not need to take a stand — prior to estimation — on the
specific (and somewhat arbitrary) threshold levels below which a household is considered to be, for
example, younger, poorer or more levered.
26The considerable variation in the rate at which different birth cohorts transition into home
ownership reported in Bottazzi et al. (2010) appears another plausible candidate to reconcile the
estimates based on the two grouping strategies in Figures 4 and 7.
27In that Appendix, we also show that (i) older mortgagors (born before 1955) still respond more
than older outright owners (also born before 1955), (ii) the response of mortgagors is significant for
both ‘younger’ and ‘older’ cohorts, but (iii) the response of outright owners is never significant.
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Rational Inattention. An alternative explanation for the mortgagors’ differential
reaction to small and large tax changes might be provided by rational inattention.
To the extent that the ‘smaller’ changes are small relative to household income,
mortgagors may rationally choose to pay little attention to the extra resources and
not re-optimize their consumption-saving plan. On the other hand, as we have already
mentioned, the response of outright home-owners does not vary significantly with the
size of the tax change despite this group having an average income that is only
slightly lower than the mortgagors’. We conclude that rational inattention is unlikely
to explain all our findings.
Impatience and risk aversion. Impatience and risk aversion may play a role in
explaining why mortgagors change their consumption significantly following a tax
change. However, these explanations do not seem to easily explain why mortgagors
respond more to smaller income tax changes than to larger tax changes. As a result,
these hypotheses seem to square less well with our results than housing tenure.
Compositional changes. Even if one can construct a consistent time series of
consumption changes for each cohort (as we have argued in Section 3), a change in the
composition of each tenure group may still affect the interpretation of our estimates.
This could be the case, for instance, if a significant sub-set of social renters took
advantage of the ‘Right-to-Buy’ scheme launched by the Conservative Party during
the 1980s, which allowed those living in accommodation rented from local authorities
or housing associations to purchase their house at a subsidized price.
To explore this compositional change interpretation of our evidence, we perform
two additional exercises. First, in the online Appendix we ask how fast and large such
a compositional change would need to have been to account for the heterogeneity
documented in this paper. The bottom line of this thought-experiment is that it is
very hard to come up with a compositional change that could rationalise the response
of mortgagors without generating predictions for the other groups that are largely at
odds with the rest of our evidence.
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In the second exercise, we restrict our focus to mortgagors with income above the
median value of their group in each quarter. This sub-set of households with debt is
the most likely to be populated by ‘genuine’ mortgagors (as opposed to social renters
who became mortgagors because of the government incentives). The results in the
Appendix confirms the finding in the top panel of Figure 4, consistent with the view
that compositional changes seem unlikely to account for our findings.
6 Concluding remarks
Recent years have witnessed a renewed interest in the role of household debt in the
transmission of macroeconomic shocks. Theoretical studies have formalised the idea
that some agents may become liquidity constrained by purchasing a large illiquid asset
such as housing. A main implication of this ongoing research effort is that, following
an exogenous change in taxes, households with mortgage debt could increase their
consumption by more than those without.
Our results are strongly suggestive of the notion that tax cuts affect consumption
mostly by relaxing liquidity constraints for indebted households. In particular, we are
able to document that the data line up with a number of qualitative and quantita-
tive predictions of models stressing illiquidity problems faced by households who have
significant positive net wealth. However, because mortgage status is not randomly as-
signed, there are potential selection concerns that imply our analysis may not be fully
conclusive. Identifying, or engineering, an empirical setting where mortgagor versus
outright owner status is randomly assigned appears to be a formidable challenge, but
definitive proof that mortgage status is the cause of households’ response to tax cuts
may have to await for such a feat to be accomplished. Nevertheless, the result that
a household’s debt position is a strong predictor of its consumption response to tax
cuts has potentially far-reaching policy implications.
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Figure 1: Tax liability changes over GDP: income tax measure (red) vs. all exogenous
tax changes (black dashed)
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Figure 2: Shares of social renters, mortgagors and outright home owners.
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Response of non−durable consumption: mortgagors
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Figure 4: Dynamic effects of a per-taxpayer liability change in the allowance and
basic rate of income tax on the change in per-capita non-durable goods and services
consumption across housing tenures using a VAR in non-durable consumption per-
capita change, real GDP per-capita change, real government spending per-capita
change and Bank Rate specified as in Section 3. Shaded areas (grey lines) represent
68% (95%) confidence bands over 10,000 bootstrap repetitions. Sample: 1978-2009.
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Figure 5: Dynamic effects of a per-taxpayer liability change in the allowance and
basic rate of income tax on the change in per-capita non-durable goods and services
consumption across predicted housing tenures (based on probit estimation) using a
VAR in non-durable consumption per-capita change, real GDP per-capita change, real
government spending per-capita change and Bank Rate. Left (right) column refers
to full sample (year-by-year) probit and time-varying (fixed) classification cutoff for
‘likely’ and ‘unlikely’ mortgagors. Shaded areas (grey lines) represent 68% (95%)
confidence bands over 10,000 bootstrap repetitions. Sample: 1978-2009.
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Figure 6: Dynamic effects of a per-taxpayer liability change on the change in per-
capita non-durable goods and services consumption for mortgagors using a VAR
in non-durable consumption per-capita change, real GDP per-capita change, real
government spending per-capita change and Bank Rate. An average tax change in
the ‘smaller tax changes’ (‘larger tax changes’) category corresponds to a liability
change in personal allowance and the basic rate of about 500 pounds (1, 500 pounds)
per household over three years at 2009 prices. Shaded areas (solid lines) represent
68% (95%) confidence bands over 10,000 bootstrap repetitions. The blue dashed line
with squares refers to the point estimates for the non-durable consumption response
of mortgagors in the baseline specification of the top of Figure 4. Sample: 1978-2009.
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Figure 7: Dynamic effects of a per-taxpayer liability change in the allowance and
basic rate of income tax on the change in per-capita non-durable goods and services
consumption across birth cohorts and education levels using a VAR in non-durable
consumption per-capita change, real GDP per-capita change, real government spend-
ing per-capita change and Bank Rate. Shaded areas (grey lines) represent 68% (95%)
confidence bands over 10,000 bootstrap repetitions. Sample: 1978-2009. Percentages
refer to the share of mortgagors and the share of outright owner within each birth
year/education cohort.
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Table 1: Net Wealth Position by Housing Tenure
Panel A: 2005 British Household Panel Survey at 2005 pounds
p25 median p75 mean obs
Net Financial Wealth
social renters -400 0 150 470 1,337
mortgagors -3,250 0 4,600 3,014 3,179
owners outright 0 3,000 21,540 18,293 2,385
Net Housing Wealth
social renters 0 0 0 0 1,337
mortgagors 55,000 95,000 150,000 113,257 3,179
owners outright 100,000 150,000 230,000 189,385 2,385
Panel B: 2000 British Household Panel Survey at 2000 pounds
p25 median p75 mean obs
Net Financial Wealth
social renters -300 0 250 959 1,959
mortgagors -2,000 82 5,500 4,197 3,234
owners outright 0 3,500 20,000 15,889 2,009
Net Housing Wealth
social renters 0 0 0 0 1,959
mortgagors 16,000 38,000 71,400 54,572 3,234
owners outright 50,000 75,000 120,000 97,284 2,009
Panel C: 1995 British Household Panel Survey at 1995 pounds
p25 median p75 mean obs
Net Financial Wealth
social renters -50 0 400 1,185 944
mortgagors -750 193 3,690 4,209 2,024
owners outright 25 3,000 16,540 15,711 1,054
Net Housing Wealth
social renters 0 0 0 0 944
mortgagors 29,000 10,000 55,000 37,162 2,024
owners outright 44,000 60,000 85,000 72,069 1,054
Note: Net financial wealth is the value of savings and investments less outstanding non-mortgage
debt. Housing wealth is the household’s estimate of the property value net of any outstanding
mortgage. p25 is 25th percentile and p75 is 75th percentile.
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Table 2: Quantitative Comparison with Earlier Contributions
Panel A: consumption relative to income
(likely) mortgagors (likely) outright owners
Propensity Score:
(time-varying threshold) 0.54∗∗∗
[0.12 , 1.55]
0.06
[−0.44 , 0.43]
(fixed threshold) 0.57∗∗∗
[0.22 , 1.27]
0.10
[−0.75 , 0.66]
Actual Tenure 0.55∗∗∗
[0.22 , 1.49]
0.14
[−3.58 , 3.55]
Kaplan-Violante 0.43 0.07
Panel B: consumption relative to taxes
(likely) mortgagors (likely) outright owners
Propensity Score
(time-varying threshold) 1.06∗∗∗
[0.23 , 1.88]
0.12
[−0.63 , 0.90]
(fixed threshold) 1.30∗∗∗
[0.52 , 2.11]
0.16
[−0.64 , 0.98]
Actual Tenure 1.33∗∗∗
[0.55 , 2.16]
0.10
[−0.62 , 0.87]
Romer-Romer PCE: 0.89
Panel C: income relative to taxes
(likely) mortgagors (likely) outright owners
Propensity Score
(time-varying threshold) 1.97∗∗∗
[0.62 , 3.33]
2.13∗∗∗
[0.87 , 3.40]
(fixed threshold) 2.29∗∗∗
[1.08 , 3.53]
1.68∗∗∗
[0.38 , 2.98]
Actual Tenure 2.40∗∗∗
[0.85 , 3.96]
0.70
[−1.00 , 2.50]
Romer-Romer GDP: 1.78
Note: Panel A reports the ratio of the present value of the non-durable expenditure change to the
present value of the disposable income change in the three years after the shock. Panel B (C)
records the ratio of the discounted total non-durable expenditure (disposable income) change to
the discounted total tax change over the same horizon. PCE (GDP) stands for per-capita Personal
Consumption Expenditure (Gross Domestic Product) from National Accounts. The rows for Romer
and Romer (2010) refer to the U.S.; similar findings are obtained for the U.K. following Cloyne
(2013). Squared brackets display the [5th , 95th] percentiles of the distribution of interest across
10,000 bootstrap repetitions. Asterisks denote significance at the 5% level.
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Appendices
A The UK income tax system
In the United Kingdom, income tax accounts for around 25–30 per cent of total
government revenue and consists of a set of allowances, bands of income and marginal
tax rates that apply to each income band. Each individual has a personal allowance
which is deducted from their income to calculate their ‘taxable income’. An income
taxpayer is therefore someone who earns more than their allowance (although there
is a system of tax credits that lowers the tax liability of the poorest taxpayers). In
the tax year 2012-2013, for instance, the first 34, 370 pounds above the allowance
was subject to a 20 per cent rate, any further earnings up to 150, 000 pounds were
subject to a 40 per cent rate and then 50 per cent was charged on all earnings over
£ 150,000. These bands and allowances are increased each year in line with inflation
unless the UK Parliament decides otherwise. We do not treat automatic inflationary
increases as tax shocks in our data set.
B Data description
B.1 Aggregate data
• GDP and government spending data: UK Office for National Statistics codes
ABMI, BKTL and NMRY. UK Total Population data are from Eurostat. FTSE
data are the FTSE All Share Index from Bloomberg.
• Price index : Retail Prices Index excluding mortgage interest payments (RPIX),
ONS codes CHMK and CDKQ (extended back from 1976 using the growth in
the Retail Prices Index, CZBH).
• We scale our tax measure by the total number of taxpayers, available from Her
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs’ website (www.hmrc.gov.uk).
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• Data on income tax thresholds used for constructing our final micro dataset are
from the Institute for Fiscal Studies (www.ifs.org.uk). See the text for more
discussion.
• Data sources for the construction of our income tax shocks can be found in the
Online Appendix. The tax series also makes use of tax shock data from Cloyne
(2013).
B.2 Household micro data
We use the Family Expenditure Survey (later called the Expenditure and Food Survey
and, recently, the Living Costs and Food Survey) from 1978 to 2009. These data are
available from the UK Data Archive.
Household consumption expenditure
• Non-durable goods and services expenditure: includes food, alcohol, tobacco,
fuel, light and power, clothing and footwear, personal goods and services, fares,
leisure services, household services, non-durable household goods, motoring ex-
penditures and leisure goods.
• Durable expenditure: durable household goods, motor vehicles and durable
leisure goods. This includes expenditure such as furniture and furnishings,
electrical appliances and audio-visual equipment.
• Total non-housing expenditure: total expenditure minus housing expenditures
(including rents, rates and water charges).
• We gross-up using household weights and divide by the number of household
members to construct a per capita measure.
Housing tenure
The FES records the tenure status of households. Social renters are defined as
those living in local authority housing or accommodation provided by housing associ-
ations. Mortgagors and owners are taken directly from the FES. The private renters
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category is dropped due to the limited number of observations.
Demographics and other loan
The demographic variables are taken from the FES: age, education and employment
status of the head of household. The data on non-mortgage loans is a binary indicator
for whether the household also has another type of loan other than a mortgage.
British Household Panel Survey
The BHPS is available from the UK Data Archive.
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C Demographics over time
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Figure 8: Evolution of age, education and income distributions across housing tenures.
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D Sensitivity Analysis
Response of non−durable consumption: mortgagors
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Figure 9: Dynamic effects of a per-taxpayer liability change in the allowance and
basic rate of income tax on the change in per-capita non-durable goods and services
consumption across housing tenures using a VAR in non-durable consumption per-
capita change, real GDP per-capita change, real government spending per-capita
change, Bank Rate and other exogenous tax changes. Shaded areas (grey lines)
represent 68% (95%) confidence bands over 10,000 bootstrap repetitions. Sample:
1978-2009.
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Response of non−durable consumption: mortgagors
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Figure 10: Dynamic effects of an ‘unanticipated’ per-taxpayer liability change in
the allowance and basic rate of income tax on the change in per-capita non-durable
goods and services consumption across housing tenures using a VAR in non-durable
consumption per-capita change, real GDP per-capita change, real government spend-
ing per-capita change and Bank Rate. ‘Unanticipated’ changes refer to exogenous
tax changes that were implemented within 90 days of announcement. Shaded areas
(grey lines) represent 68% (95%) confidence bands over 10,000 bootstrap repetitions.
Sample: 1978-2009.
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Figure 12: Dynamic effects of a per-taxpayer liability change in the allowance and
basic rate of income tax on the change in per-capita expenditure on food, strictly
non-durable and non-housing goods and services across housing tenures using a VAR
in non-durable consumption per-capita change, real GDP per-capita change, real
government spending per-capita change and Bank Rate. Shaded areas (grey lines)
represent 68% (95%) confidence bands over 10,000 bootstrap repetitions. Sample:
1978-2009.
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Response of non−durable consumption: mortgagors
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Figure 13: Dynamic effects of a per-taxpayer liability change in the allowance and
basic rate of income tax on the change in per-capita non-durable goods and services
consumption across housing tenure using a VAR in non-durable consumption per-
capita change, real GDP per-capita change, real government spending per capita
change and Bank Rate, controlling for the amount of the tax change. Shaded areas
(grey lines) represent 68% (95%) confidence bands over 10,000 bootstrap repetitions.
Sample: 1978-2009.
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F Further results on demographics
Response of non−durable consumption: born after 1955
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Figure 15: Dynamic effects of a per-taxpayer liability change in the allowance and
basic rate of income tax on the change in per-capita non-durable goods and services
consumption across birth cohorts. Shaded areas (grey lines) represent 68% (95%)
confidence bands over 10,000 bootstrap repetitions. Sample: 1978-2009.
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Response of non−durable consumption: compulsory education
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Figure 16: Dynamic effects of a per-taxpayer liability change in the allowance and
basic rate of income tax on the change in per-capita non-durable goods and services
consumption across education levels. Shaded areas (grey lines) represent 68% (95%)
confidence bands over 10,000 bootstrap repetitions. Sample: 1978-2009.
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Figure 17: Dynamic effects of a per-taxpayer liability change in the allowance and
basic rate of income tax on the change in per-capita non-durable goods and services
consumption across housing tenure and birth cohorts. Shaded areas (grey lines)
represent 68% (95%) confidence bands over 10,000 bootstrap repetitions. Significantly
fewer observations per cell are available in the pseudo-cohort in the bottom left panel.
Sample: 1978-2009.
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G Above- and below-median income mortgagors
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Figure 18: Dynamic effects of a per-taxpayer liability change in the allowance and
basic rate of income tax on the change in per-capita non-durable goods and services
consumption for households with mortgage debt and head with above- (top panel) and
below-mortgagors’ median income (bottom panel) in each quarter using a VAR in non-
durable consumption per-capita change, income per-capita change, real government
spending per-capita change and Bank Rate. Shaded areas (grey lines) represent 68%
(95%) confidence bands over 10,000 bootstrap repetitions. Sample: 1978-2009.
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On-line Appendices
H Predicting housing tenure changes
Table A: Predicting Changes in the Housing Tenure Status
Model non-linear linear
probit logit baseline fixed effects
Regressors:
∆ family size i,t 0.246
∗∗∗
(0.022)
0.488∗∗∗
(0.041)
0.042∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.035∗∗∗
(0.004)
first lag 0.136∗∗∗
(0.023)
0.264∗∗∗
(0.044)
0.018∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.010∗∗
(0.004)
second lag 0.041
(0.025)
0.076
(0.050)
0.003
(0.004)
−0.001
(0.004)
∆ marital status i,t 0.396
∗∗∗
(0.029)
0.736∗∗∗
(0.052)
0.078∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.072∗∗∗
(0.007)
first lag 0.066∗∗
(0.030)
0.111∗
(0.066)
0.007
(0.006)
0.003
(0.006)
second lag 0.059∗
(0.034)
0.102
(0.066)
0.005
(0.005)
0.003
(0.006)
∆ employment i,t 0.270
∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.524∗∗∗
(0.045)
0.043∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.036∗∗∗
(0.005)
first lag 0.117∗∗∗
(0.024)
0.226∗∗∗
(0.046)
0.013∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.005
(0.004)
second lag 0.009
(0.026)
0.011
(0.051)
−0.006
(0.004)
−0.010
(0.004)
∗∗
∆ education i,t 0.236
∗∗∗
(0.047)
0.462∗∗∗
(0.085)
0.044∗∗∗
(0.010)
0.025∗∗
(0.010)
first lag 0.185∗∗∗
(0.047)
0.362∗∗∗
(0.088)
0.027∗∗∗
(0.010)
0.008
(0.010)
second lag 0.061
(0.054)
0.135
(0.104)
0.005
(0.009)
−0.006
(0.010)
∆ taxes t −0.0001
(0.0003)
−0.0004
(0.0006)
−0.00003
(0.00004)
−0.00004
(0.00004)
first lag 0.0003
(0.0003)
0.0005
(0.0005)
0.00006
(0.00004)
0.00006
(0.00004)
second lag −0.0002
(0.0003)
−0.0006
(0.0006)
−0.00004
(0.00004)
−0.00005
(0.00004)
(pseudo) R2 (0.039) (0.040) 0.026 0.012
Note: Estimates from a regression of a dummy for housing tenure change in year t on dummies
for family size change, marital status change, employment status change, educational attainment
change and the amount of tax changes in years t, t-1 and t-2, regional fixed effects and time trends.
∆ taxes is the cumulated liability change in personal allowance and basic rate of income tax in each
year based on the narrative identification. Source: British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). Sample:
1991-2009. Households (observations): 6801 (55327). Standard errors clustered by households are
reported in parenthesis. *** [**] (*) indicates significance at the 1% [5%] (10%) level.
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I Social renters’ income response
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Figure 19: Dynamic effects of a per-taxpayer liability change in the allowance and
basic rate of income tax on the change in renters’ per-capita income using a VAR
in non-durable consumption per-capita change, real per-capita income change, real
government spending per-capita change and Bank Rate. Shaded areas (grey lines)
represent 68% (95%) confidence bands over 10,000 bootstrap repetitions. Sample:
1978-2009.
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J Compositional changes: a thought experiment
A further way to assess the interpretation of our results as stemming from mortgage
debt positions rather than the alternative hypothesis of changing group composition,
is to ask how large and rapid the transition from one of the other groups to mortgagors
would need to be for the size of our responses to be explained by compositional
changes.28 For the sake of concreteness, and without loss of generality, consider
the estimated effects for each tenure group at the three year horizon in Figure 4 of
our submission: mortgagors’ response is about 2 pounds, social renters adjust their
consumption by 1 pound and outright owners make no significant alteration to their
expenditure. In Figure 2 of this note, we also report that social renters represented
roughly 30% (15%) of households at the beginning (end) of the sample, mortgagors
accounted for another 30% (45%) and outright owners were about 20% (25%). As our
estimates for each group represent average effects over the full sample, it is important
to recognize that the compositional change interpretation of our results relies on the
nature of the 15% of population who, over the period 1978-2009, changed housing
tenure group to join the mortgagors.
Consider a data generating process in which ‘mortgagors who were never social
renters’ (which for short we refer to as ‘private mortgagors’) and outright owners are,
in fact, all alike in that their expenditure adjustment is statistically indistinguishable
from zero. This assumption implies that –independently of the speed of transition
between tenure groups– the estimated peak effect of 2 pounds for households with
debt in Figure 4 of our submission must be some average of a close-to-zero response
of ‘private’ mortgagors and a higher-than-£2 response of another sub-group, most
likely within social renters as outright owners exhibit an estimated average response
close to zero. Similarly, to be consistent with this thought experiment, it must be the
case that the estimated effect of 1 pound for social renters is in fact the average effect
over two sub-groups: ‘social renters who became mortgagors’ and ‘social renters who
did not become mortgagors’ (which for short we refer to as ‘long-term social renters’)
with the latter having a less-than-£1 response.29
To make the calculations less favorable to our interpretation, we can further as-
sume that all switching social renters became mortgagors at the beginning of the
sample. As the change of mortgagors share over the full sample is about 15%, this
poses an upper bound to the share of ‘social renters who became mortgagors’ in the
population. As 15% is half the share of mortgagors at the beginning of the sample
and ‘private mortgagors’ are assumed not to respond, then it must be the case that
the peak adjustment of ‘social renters who became mortgagors’ after three years is
around £6, as this value would be consistent with our estimated average response
for mortgagors of 2 = (2/3) ∗ 0 + (1/3) ∗ 6, where 2/3 is the share of mortgagors at
the beginning of the sample relative to the same share at the end of the sample and
1/3 is the assumed share of ‘social renters who became mortgagors’ in the population
over the share of mortgagors at the end of the sample.
It is worth emphasizing two implications of these compositional change calcula-
tions. First, notwithstanding the extraordinary large adjustment of £6, the response
28We are grateful to Francesco Caselli for suggesting these calculations.
29It is worth noting that the empirical finding of the mortgagors response being higher than the
social renters’ implies that under the compositional change scenario the social renters group needs
to be heterogeneous, with some households adjusting their consumption by less than 1 pound (which
is the estimated average response of all social renters) and other households adjusting by more than
2 pounds (which is the estimated average response of all mortgagors).
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of ‘social renters who became mortgagors’ would be inconsistent with the estimated
average response of £1 for social renters. The reason is that even assuming that
‘long-term social renters’ do not adjust their expenditure at all, the population share
of 15% for ‘social renters who became mortgagors’ vis a vis a population share of
35% of social renters at the beginning of the sample implies that the consumption
response of the former cannot be larger than £2 to be consistent with an estimated
average response of 1 = [(1/2) ∗ 0 + (1/2) ∗ 2].30 Second, assuming any empirically
more plausible gradualism in the transition from other groups to mortgagors (as op-
posed to the abrupt change at the beginning of the sample assumed so far) could
only make the compositional change interpretation of our results less plausible. The
reason is that under any smooth transition variant of our calculations, the response
of ‘social renters who became mortgagors’ should be further down weighted in the
average calculations for the mortgagors response to reflect the fraction of the sample
over which the ‘social renters who became mortgagors’ were still part of the social
renters tenure group.
An alternative way of looking at this second implication of our thought experiment
calculations is to note that if the 15% population share of ‘social renters who became
mortgagors’ switched one third into the sample (rather than at the start of the sample
as assumed in the rest of this section), then their consumption adjustment would need
to be 9 pounds for this to be consistent with our estimated effect of £2 for mortgagors
over the full sample (i.e. 2 = {1/3} ∗ 0 + {2/3}[(2/3) ∗ 0 + (1/3) ∗ 9] where the curly
brackets refer to the fractions of the sample period before and after the compositional
change respectively).
30Note that assuming a ‘private mortgagors’ response of one pound is not sufficient (over and
above being against the spirit of the compositional change interpretation of our results) as ‘social
renters who became mortgagors’ would still need to adjust their expenditure by 4 pounds, thereby
still exceeding the upper limit of £3 that is necessary for their consumption change to be consistent
with an estimated average response for social renters of 2.
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